University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 1 Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Article 6

January 2007

A Critique of the Second Circuit’s Analysis in
Nicholas v. Goord
John Dorsett Niles

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment
Commons
Recommended Citation
Niles, John Dorsett (2007) "A Critique of the Second Circuit’s Analysis in Nicholas v. Goord," University of Massachusetts Law Review:
Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr/vol2/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.

A Critique of the Second Circuit’s Analysis
in Nicholas v. Goord
JOHN DORSETT NILES*
INTRODUCTION

F

ortunately for law enforcement officers, every human
being leaves behind a small number of cells wherever he
goes—including a crime scene.1 Each cell contains
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a substance that carries the
individual’s genetic code. Genetic code is very likely unique
to each human being, and law enforcement officers have used
this fact since the 1980s to help solve crimes: They have
compared DNA collected at crime scenes against DNA from
known individuals to help either prove or disprove the
individuals’ presence at the crime scenes.2
In part to help law enforcement officers use crime scene
DNA, every state has enacted a law allowing the state to
create and to maintain a database of human DNA.3 Because a
larger DNA database makes for a better DNA database, every
state also has enacted legislation aimed at increasing the
number of individuals whose DNA its database catalogues.
Many of these “DNA-indexing” statutes operate coercively,
compelling certain classes of individuals (usually convicted
felons) to provide their DNA.4 Affected individuals often
object that these statutes overreach Fourth Amendment
*

Candidate for J.D., 2008, Duke University School of Law.
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1
Shaila K. Dewan, As Police Extend Use of DNA, a Smudge Could
Trap a Thief, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A1.
2
Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnet —A Constitutional Catch?, 54 DRAKE
L. REV. 15, 16 (2005).
3
Id. at 16–17.
4
See, e.g., 1994 N.Y. Laws 737, § 1 (codified as amended at N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 995-C(3) (McKinney 2004)) (requiring felons convicted of
certain specified crimes to provide a DNA sample for inclusion in New
York’s DNA database).

207

208

Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Vol. 2

bounds. Lawsuits in over thirty jurisdictions have challenged
DNA-indexing statutes’ constitutionality.5 This Case Note
focuses on one such case, Nicholas v. Goord.6
The Case Note proceeds as follows. Part I traces the
historical and procedural facts underlying Nicholas. Part II
describes the legal backdrop against which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the case.
Part III steps through the Second Circuit’s majority opinion,
and Part IV critiques the opinion. Part V concludes the Case
Note by discussing the ramifications of Nicholas for future
DNA-indexing cases.
I. FACTS
In Nicholas v. Goord, nine prison inmates challenged the
constitutionality of New York’s DNA-indexing statute.7
Pursuant to that statute, government contractors extracted
blood from each plaintiff, analyzed that blood for unique
DNA strands, and then catalogued those unique strands in
New York’s DNA database.8 The inmates claimed these
actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights.9 They sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and to have their DNA
expunged from New York’s DNA database. The
Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Correctional Services, the Director of the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services, the private bloodtesting company that extracted the prisoners’ blood, and one
of the company’s employees were the named defendants.10
The inmates’ lawsuit implicated several provisions of
New York’s DNA-indexing statute. The statute, as it existed
at the time of the lawsuit, compelled all individuals who had
been convicted of certain felonies to provide a DNA sample
5

See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2004)
(collecting cases).
6
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005).
7
Id. at 652.
8
Id. at 655–56.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 652, 656.

2007

A Critique in Nicholas v. Goord

209

for inclusion in New York’s DNA database.11 It forbade the
State of New York from cataloguing medically significant
DNA,12 and further restricted the government to cataloguing
only those strands of an individual’s DNA “having value for
law enforcement identification purposes.”13
Once
catalogued, however, the government could use a record in its
DNA database for any of several purposes: to help solve any
crime,14 identify human remains,15 exonerate a criminal
defendant,16 or conduct research.17 To keep government
actors from misusing database records, the statute
criminalized any unauthorized use or unauthorized disclosure
of a record.18 The statute also required the government to
expunge an individual’s DNA record if the individual
received a pardon or if his conviction was overturned.19 But
the statute permitted the government to keep an individual’s
DNA record indefinitely if he left custody in almost any other
manner, including through normal release.20
When Nicholas came before a magistrate judge, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).21 The magistrate judge, assessing the plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claim under a “special needs” test,22
recommended that the motion be granted.23 A district judge
then reached the same conclusion by a different route. He
assessed the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim under a
balancing test24 instead of the special needs test, but he
11

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(3) (McKinney 2004).
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 655.
13
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(5).
14
Id. § 995-c(6)(a).
15
Id. § 995-c(6)(a).
16
Id. § 995-c(6)(b).
17
N.Y. EXEC. LAW section 995-c(6)(c) (McKinney 2004).
18
Id. § 995-f.
19
Id. § 995-c(9).
20
See id. (requiring the government to expunge a record only “[u]pon
receipt of notification of a reversal of a conviction, or of the granting of a
pardon . . . [or] other appropriate circumstances”).
21
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 2005).
22
See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
23
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 656–57.
24
See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
12
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ultimately dismissed the case.25 The plaintiffs appealed.26
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit heard their appeal, several of the plaintiffs finished
serving their prison sentences and were released from the
government’s custody.27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures.28 For a search29 to be
reasonable, an agent of the government ordinarily must
receive permission to conduct it. Permission may come in
either of two forms: an individual may voluntarily consent to
be searched, or a magistrate may issue a search warrant.30
Although a search warrant obviates the need for voluntary
consent, its availability actually serves to limit the
government’s power. The government usually must obtain a
warrant if it fails to gain consent,31 and relatively few
circumstances exist under which the government may obtain
a warrant. As the Fourth Amendment decrees, “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”32
The Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
contain a “few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions” to the requirement of either voluntary consent or
a warrant.33 The Court developed these exceptions in a series
of cases beginning with Terry v. Ohio.34 Terry came before
25

Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 657.
Id. at 655, 657.
27
Id. at 666 n.25, 671 n.32.
28
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29
A search is constitutionally indistinguishable from a seizure.
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 673 n.1 (Leval, J., concurring). For simplicity, this
Case Note refers either to a search or a seizure as a “search.”
30
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973)
(granting permission through voluntary consent); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (granting permission through a search warrant).
31
E.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390.
32
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 660 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390).
34
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26
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the Court after a police officer patted down the outer layer of
clothing on an individual whom the officer reasonably
suspected of concealing a gun.35 The officer had not obtained
a warrant before patting down the man’s clothing.36 The
Court held the pat down to be a constitutionally cognizable
search, but it refused immediately to hold the search
unconstitutional for lack of a warrant. Instead, the Court
analyzed the search’s constitutionality through a balancing
test. The Court weighed the officer’s invasion of the
suspect’s privacy against the officer’s reasonable suspicion of
a concealed gun and the danger that a hidden lethal weapon
could pose to the officer and to the general public.37 The
Court upheld the search.38
The Court went one step further in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte39 where it upheld a warrantless search even
though the search had been based on no suspicion at all.40
Martinez-Fuerte arose after the United States Border Patrol
caught two individuals attempting to smuggle undocumented
aliens through a permanent, clearly advertised checkpoint
near the U.S.-Mexico border.41 The Border Patrol caught the
individuals by searching their vehicles, but it had not
possessed any particularized suspicion when it commenced
the search; “the flow of traffic tend[ed] to be too heavy to
allow the particularized study of a given car that would
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal
aliens.”42 Despite the absence of a warrant and the absence
even of suspicion, the Court once again refused immediately
to hold the search unconstitutional. Rather, it once again
assessed the search’s constitutionality under a balancing test.
Noting that a requirement even of reasonable suspicion would
35

Id. at 6–7.
See id.
37
See id. at 23–24, 28, 29–30 (assessing the reasonableness of the
decision to search and the reasonableness of the extent of the search).
38
Id. at 30–31.
39
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
40
Id. at 545, 562, 566.
41
Id. at 545–47 (describing the checkpoint and the systematic
inspections).
42
Id. at 557.
36
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have been impractical under the circumstances, the Court
upheld the search because the government’s interest in
securing the nation’s borders outweighs a driver’s interest in
privacy.43
The Court’s warrantless search jurisprudence took a new
turn in New Jersey v. T.L.O.44 Before T.L.O., the Court had
assessed a warrantless search simply by balancing the
government’s interest in conducting the search against an
individual’s countervailing interest in privacy.45
The
majority of the Court actually continued to apply this test in
T.L.O., but Justice Blackmun argued persuasively in
concurrence to modify the test.46 He noted that the Fourth
Amendment’s Framers had emphasized the importance of a
search warrant.47 To be true to the Framers’ intent, the Court
therefore should require the government to obtain a warrant
except in the rare circumstances when the relatively long
process of obtaining a warrant would frustrate the
government’s very need for it.48 Although Justice Blackmun
would continue to employ a Fourth Amendment balancing
test, he would invoke the test only after the Court ensured
that “special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable.”49
During the sixteen years following T.L.O., the Court
repeatedly invoked Justice Blackmun’s “special needs” test to
assess warrantless searches.50 The Second Circuit followed
43

Id. at 557, 561–62.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
45
See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–62 (balancing the
government’s interest to search against a driver’s privacy interest).
46
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47
Id. at 351 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–80 (1987) (invoking
the special needs test to uphold the warrantless search of a probationer’s
home); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–45, 46–47
(2000) (holding that a roadside police checkpoint for narcotics did not
serve an ordinary law enforcement need); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
44
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suit.51 Recently, however, the Court cast doubt upon the
special needs test’s continued validity. The Court muddied
the waters in United States v. Knights.52 In Knights, a man on
probation challenged the constitutionality of a warrantless
search.53 A police officer had searched the probationer’s
home because he reasonably suspected the home contained
evidence linking the probationer to a recent arson.54 Rather
than applying the special needs test, the Court simply
balanced the probationer’s privacy interest against the
government’s search interests.55 As the Court reasoned, the
probationer enjoyed only a reduced privacy interest, even in
his home, because as a probationer he remained under the
state’s supervision.56 On the other side of the balance, the
government possessed a strong interest to operate the penal
system of which the probationer was part.57 The police
officer held a reasonable suspicion of the probationer’s guilt
at the time of the search.58 In light of these factors, the Court
upheld the search.59 The Court explicitly left open the
question of whether the government may conduct an entirely
suspicionless search of a probationer’s home.60
The DNA-indexing statutes fit squarely into the hole left
open by Knights because they authorize suspicionless
searches of individuals in government custody.61 Although
532 U.S. 67, 79–86 (2001) (invoking the special needs test to strike down
suspicionless, systematic drug tests of pregnant women in a hospital).
51
See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (invoking
the special needs test to uphold Connecticut’s DNA-indexing statute).
52
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
53
Id. at 116.
54
See id. at 115 (describing the circumstances that gave rise to the
officer’s reasonable suspicion).
55
See id. at 118–21 (invoking a general balancing test).
56
Id. at 119–20.
57
Id. at 120–21.
58
Id. at 122.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 120 (“[W]e need not address the constitutionality of a
suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by
reasonable suspicion.”).
61
To be sure, the Court did decide a case shortly after Knights that
involved a suspicionless seizure. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419
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the Court shunned Justice Blackmun’s special needs test in
Knights in favor of a balancing test, the Court did not openly
reject the special needs test. The resulting ambiguity has
inspired sharp disagreement among federal circuit courts
assessing the constitutionality of DNA-indexing statutes. The
Third,62 Fifth,63 and Eleventh64 Circuits have opted to assess
the statutes’ validity under a balancing test. The Seventh65
and Tenth66 Circuits have chosen the special needs test. The
Ninth Circuit has resolutely failed to choose a test,
deadlocking on the issue while sitting en banc.67
Interestingly, every circuit court to consider a DNA-indexing
statute has upheld it.68
III. HOLDING
In Nicholas v. Goord, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld New York’s DNA-indexing
statute under the special needs test.69 Reviewing the district
court’s judgment de novo,70 the court commenced its analysis
by noting that the statute authorized searches that were

(2004). But the seizure at issue in that case occurred in the context of a
highway traffic checkpoint in which police officers seized ordinary
citizens who were not in the government’s custody. Id. at 422. The case
therefore sheds no light into whether the government may conduct a
suspicionless search of an individual who is in the government’s custody.
62
United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005).
63
Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir.
2004) (per curiam).
64
Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2005).
65
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004).
66
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).
67
Compare United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir.
2004) (O’Scannlain, J.) (plurality opinion) (voting for the balancing test),
with id. at 840 (Gould, J., concurring) (voting for the special needs test)
and id. at 857 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (invoking the special needs test)
and id. at 872–73 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing against the balancing
test) and id. at 875 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (voting for the special needs
test).
68
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005).
69
Id. at 672.
70
Id. at 657.
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constitutionally cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.71
Because the statute implicated the Fourth Amendment, the
court recognized that it needed to assess the statute’s
constitutionality under either the special needs test or the
general balancing test.72 Although the Second Circuit adopted
the special needs test only six years earlier,73 the court
revisited the issue in light of several intervening Supreme
Court cases and the fairly even split among its sister circuit
courts.74
To guide its decision, the court examined past warrantless
search cases. It focused particularly upon suspicionless
search cases.75 After surveying the modern suspicionless
search cases, the court held that the analysis in every modern
suspicionless search case conforms to the special needs test.76
Moreover, Knights had not altered the playing field.77 As the
court elucidated, Knights involved a search undertaken with
reasonable suspicion; the case was inapposite to suspicionless
search cases.78 To comply with the relevant line of authority,
the court adopted the special needs test.79
After the court adopted the special needs test, it applied a
version of the test to New York’s DNA-indexing statute.80
71

Id. at 658 (“[T]he extraction and analysis of plaintiffs’ blood for
DNA-indexing purposes constituted a search implicating the Fourth
Amendment.”).
72
Id.
73
See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (invoking
the special needs test to uphold Connecticut’s DNA-indexing statute).
74
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 659–60.
75
Id. at 660–63.
76
Id. at 661 (“What unifies these cases, despite their varied contexts,
is that in each instance, the Court found that the suspicionless-search
regime at issue served some special need distinct from normal lawenforcement needs.”). As a note, the Supreme Court has applied a general
balancing test in one Fourth Amendment case since Nicholas. See
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). However, Samson does not
overrule Nicholas: it adjudicates the Fourth Amendment rights of a
parolee rather than a prison inmate. United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d
73, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007).
77
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 665, 666.
78
Id. at 665–66.
79
Id. at 667.
80
Id. at 667–72.
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Unlike Justice Blackmun’s special needs test, the court’s
formulation of the test does not require the process of
obtaining a warrant to cause the warrant to be impractical to
obtain.81 Instead, the court’s test examines only whether the
government possesses a need, apart from ordinary law
enforcement, to conduct a suspicionless search.82 The court
held that New York’s DNA-indexing statute served such a
need: “to assist in solving crimes.”83 As the court explained,
using a DNA database to help solve crimes serves a need
apart from ordinary law enforcement because, “at the time of
collection, the [DNA] samples . . . provide no evidence in and
of themselves of criminal wrongdoing, and are not sought for
the investigation of a specific crime.”84
The court then considered the searches’ reasonableness
under its articulation of the special needs test.85 The court
ruled that New York had possessed a strong interest to build
and maintain a DNA database because the database improved
the accuracy of evidence in some criminal proceedings,
helped to catch ex-convicts who perpetrated new crimes, and
discouraged recidivism.86 On the other side of the balance,
the statute infringed on a prison inmate’s privacy interest in
two ways: First, the statute required a prison inmate to give
up bodily fluids;87 and second, the statute authorized New
York to “analyze[] DNA for information and maintain[] DNA
records indefinitely.”88
The court separately considered the two invasions of
privacy. First, the court assessed the degree to which the
mandatory extraction of an inmate’s bodily fluids invades his
81

Id. at 672. The court held a warrant was impractical to obtain
under New York’s statute only because “[o]btaining a warrant requires
probable cause, which obviously does not exist in the context of
suspicionless searches.” Id. at 671 (internal citation omitted).
82
Id. at 667–69.
83
Id. at 668.
84
Id. at 669 (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, Report-Recommendation,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at 13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003).
85
Id. at 669–71.
86
Id. at 669.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 670.
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reasonable expectation of privacy.89 The court held that such
an extraction constitutes only a minimal invasion; “inmates
are routinely subject to medical procedures, including blood
draws.”90 The court weighed this minimal intrusion against
the government’s strong interest in collecting an inmate’s
DNA, and it upheld the statute’s mandatory DNA
extractions.91
Next, the court assessed the degree to which the analysis
of, and indefinite storage of, an inmate’s DNA markers
intrudes on his reasonable expectation of privacy.92 Because
New York’s statute forbade the government from analyzing
or maintaining medically significant strands of DNA, the
court described a DNA record as strongly resembling a
fingerprint; both devices merely serve as a means by which to
identify a person.93 The government already maintains a
constitutionally permissible fingerprint database, to which
even a mere arrestee’s fingerprints may permanently be
added.94 Given that the government may forever keep the
fingerprints of a mere arrestee, the government’s indefinite
storage of a convicted felon’s DNA constituted a “relatively
minimal” invasion of privacy.95 Thus, New York’s DNAindexing statute was valid in its entirety. The court affirmed
the district court’s judgment.96
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct
to adopt the special needs test in Nicholas. However, in
applying that test, the court unfortunately strayed from
Supreme Court precedent by refusing to stipulate that, for a

89

Id. at 669.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 670.
93
Id. at 671.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 671.
96
Id. at 672.
90
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warrantless search to be reasonable, a warrant must be
impractical to obtain.
A. Propriety of the Special Needs Test
The circuit courts have split on whether to analyze the
constitutionality of DNA-indexing statutes under a balancing
test or the special needs test.97 The courts’ disagreement
centers on whether the Supreme Court’s holding in United
States v. Knights extends from a reasonable-suspicion search
of a probationer to a suspicionless search of a prison inmate.
In Nicholas, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
correctly rejected Knights’s applicability. The court then
properly followed controlling authority when it adopted the
special needs test.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a reasonablesuspicion search differs from a suspicionless search in a
constitutionally significant manner.98
Since Nicholas
involved a suspicionless search while Knights involved a
reasonable-suspicion search, the cases turned on
constitutionally distinct facts. Because the cases turned on
constitutionally distinct facts, the Second Circuit was correct
to hold that Knights did not bind its decision of which test to
use.99
When the Second Circuit ultimately adopted the special
needs test, it correctly followed controlling authority. The
Supreme Court often has invoked the special needs test,
either implicitly or explicitly, to adjudicate suspicionless
search cases.100 Because Knights did not overrule this
authority, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was
correct to follow it in Nicholas. Also, although a court’s own
97

See cases cited supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001)
(considering a reasonable-suspicion search; reserving judgment on
whether a suspicionless search would pass constitutional muster).
99
See United States ex rel. Kustas v. Williams, 194 F.2d 642, 643 (2d
Cir. 1952) (refusing to apply as precedent a Supreme Court case turned on
constitutionally distinct facts).
100
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–45, 46–
47 (2000).
98
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earlier decisions do not bind it absolutely, the Second
Circuit’s decision in Nicholas to abide by its six-year-old
precedent had the positive effect of contributing to the
predictability of law.
B.

Requiring a Warrant to be Impractical to
Obtain

Although the court was correct to invoke the special
needs test, it strayed from Supreme Court precedent when
applying the test. Under Justice Blackmun’s special needs
test, a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable
unless: (1) the search serves a special government need aside
from ordinary law enforcement; and (2) because of that need,
a warrant is impractical to obtain.101 The latter requirement is
important because it narrows the government’s ability to
search without a warrant. By doing so, it gives effect to the
Framers’ intent to enshrine probable cause as the usual
standard for the government to meet before it searches an
individual.102
Under the Second Circuit’s formulation of the special
needs test, however, a search is presumptively unreasonable
unless the search serves a special government need aside
from ordinary law enforcement.103 For all searches serving
purposes outside the solitary realm of law enforcement, this
test collapses into a mere balancing test. Under the balancing
test, the government may sidestep the Warrant Clause so long
as its interests in conducting a search outweigh an
individual’s privacy interest.104 Yet such a low threshold
runs counter to Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme
Court turned away from such a balancing test because its
laxity undermines the Framers’ intent to require a warrant
and probable cause in all but impractical circumstances. To
101

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
102
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
103
See id. at 667 (discussing Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74, 78, 79
(2d Cir. 1999)).
104
See cases cited supra notes 67–69.
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follow the Court’s controlling line of precedent and to abide
by the Framers’ intent, the Second Circuit should have
stipulated that a warrantless search is presumptively
unreasonable unless, under the circumstances surrounding the
search, a warrant is impractical for the government to obtain.
Separately, in dictum, the court leaves language that
would become troubling if another court were to pick it up.
The court notes that New York’s DNA-indexing statute
called for suspicionless searches, which fail probable
cause.105 Because a magistrate may issue a warrant only
upon a showing of probable cause, no warrant could issue to
implement the statute.106
This language is troubling because, if a court were ever to
adopt it, all reasonable-suspicion searches and suspicionless
searches under a statute like New York’s DNA-indexing
statute would immediately satisfy the special needs test’s
impracticality requirement. Under such analysis, the
requirement of impracticality would be almost meaningless.
The government would become much freer to search
individuals without a warrant or probable cause, undermining
the Fourth Amendment.107 A court would be more faithful to
the Framers’ intent by following Justice Blackmun’s
articulation of the special needs test. Under that articulation, a
warrant is not impractical to obtain merely because a search
fails probable cause; rather, as in T.L.O., the time-consuming
process of obtaining a warrant must defeat the government’s
very need for it.108
105

Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671.
Id.
107
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
108
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). There, the Court
held:
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for
106
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V. CONCLUSION
In Nicholas v. Goord, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit adjudicated a Fourth Amendment
challenge to New York’s DNA-indexing statute. The statute
authorized suspicionless, warrantless searches of convicted
felons’ DNA. To assess the statute’s constitutionality, the
court had to invoke either a Fourth Amendment balancing
test or a “special needs” test to assess the statute’s
constitutionality. Nimbly untangling a messy knot of
precedent, the court properly followed the Supreme Court
and paid heed to its own prior rulings by choosing to apply
the special needs test.
When it applied the special needs test, however, the court
strayed from Supreme Court precedent by refusing to
consider a warrantless search to be presumptively
unreasonable unless the warrant were impractical to obtain.
This omission opens the door to a host of warrantless
searches that would strike against the Fourth Amendment
Framers’ intent to enshrine probable cause and a warrant as
the usual prerequisites to a constitutionally valid search. The
Second Circuit instead should have clarified that a
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless the
time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant would defeat
the government’s very need for it.
In coming years, DNA-indexing statutes likely will be a
prominent and growing issue in the law. With hope, future
courts will adopt the well-reasoned aspects of Nicholas v.
Goord but will cast aside the case’s more questionable
analysis.

the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.

